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A marketing tool turns into a malware delivery service. 178 organisations affected.
Attackers injected malicious scripts into customer websites through Optimizely. How the attack worked and what website operators should review.

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Visitors open a familiar website and receive malicious code. That happened on 16 November through Optimizely Web Experimentation, a service for website testing and personalisation. Report URI identified tampered scripts associated with 178 organisations, including the BBC, IKEA and HSBC.
Optimizely has fixed the exploited flaw and removed the injected code. Its 19 November advisory says the incident affected only Web Experimentation and fewer than five per cent of its customers. All customers of that product were informed of their individual exposure.
The malicious code came from a trusted provider
Attackers exploited an account registration flaw to impersonate users of targeted customer accounts. They then added JavaScript to those customers' projects. According to Optimizely, the attack did not involve stolen credentials.
That mattered for delivery. Websites load the code for their experiments from Optimizely. The modified version therefore reached browsers through the provider's normal infrastructure. A trusted service was now distributing an attacker's code.
Report URI's investigation describes card-data theft from forms, replacement of cryptocurrency addresses and delivery of attack tools for Apple devices. The described card skimmer could not reach data entered into separately embedded payment forms from Stripe or Adyen.
The researchers examined 1,611 scripts and found 188 modified files associated with the 178 organisations.
A website tool gains access to customer interactions
Marketing services are often chosen for better campaigns or higher conversion rates. A security review also needs to establish what their integration makes possible. A script on a public information page has different access from one in a customer portal or on a page containing payment fields.
Website operators should review these integrations jointly with marketing and IT. Which external services run on which pages? What input can they access? Who can change an integration, and who can disable it during an incident?
A list of purchased software cannot answer those questions on its own. It becomes useful when each service has identified pages, responsible people and actual access capabilities. Those details should guide the assessment of critical suppliers.
What affected operators should check now
Web Experimentation customers should review Optimizely's notice about their own exposure and its additional recommendations. The provider says the technical clean-up is complete. The affected pages and time periods still matter for an internal investigation.
The website team should preserve available logs and observed script changes, then discuss with its security lead what data those pages processed. Evidence of data exfiltration should bring the data protection lead into the investigation. Changes to scripts or the Content Security Policy need controlled testing so that security work does not accidentally break sign-in or checkout.
For the next purchase, one question helps regardless of provider: what could this service do to our customers if someone misused it? The answer determines how closely it needs to be assessed.