Guide
Risk management for public authorities: Decisions for dependable services
Build practical public-sector risk management: connect administrative services, protection needs, providers and decision-making authority.


A public authority can outsource an IT service without simply transferring its administrative mandate. When a specialist application fails, deadlines, accessibility and fallback procedures still need assessment. Risk management starts with the service provided to citizens and other bodies.
Using an application outage, establish ownership, a testable fallback procedure and a decision brief for additional capacity.
Clarify the mandate and responsibilities
Describe one specific service: which information is required? Who may decide? Which deadlines and dependencies apply? Separate business responsibility from technical operation.
Applicable rules differ by administrative level and task. Germany’s BSIG, for example, distinguishes federal administration bodies from other entity types. Do not transfer federal rules to municipalities or states without checking.
Describe risks so decisions are possible
“Application outage” initially describes an event. Add the cause, affected service and specific consequences. Distinguish short interruption from extended outage. Manual fallback may handle a few cases but fail under high volume.
| Question | Required answer |
|---|---|
| What fails? | Service and necessary information |
| How long is it tolerable? | Reasoned impact over time |
| Who can respond? | Decision-making authority and deputy |
| What works instead? | Tested procedure and resources |
Fictional case: A centrally operated application
The IT provider reports an extended interruption. The authority can receive applications but cannot finish processing them. Check how receipt, deadlines and later transfer remain traceable.
The decisive question goes beyond when the server runs again: how will the backlog be processed, and who approves extra capacity? Record the decision and underlying assumptions.
Distinguish measures from accepted risks
Planned procurement does not yet reduce risk. Implementation and verification provide a dependable basis. Remaining risks need a documented decision by the competent body.
Provider commitments should also be verifiable. Use supplier assessment to review recovery, communication and access rights against the service.
Responsibility remains specific across organisational boundaries
With a central IT provider, the authority may be unable to restore the server itself. It can define the information it needs, who receives disruption reports and how fallback decisions are made.
Agree a verifiable information requirement: affected service, confirmed restriction, next update time and contact. An unconfirmed recovery forecast should not become a firm basis for public communication.
A BPMN process makes organisational boundaries visible. Technical recovery and business resumption are different approvals. Before business approval, check incoming data, deadlines and backlogs; document remaining deviations.
Derive budget needs from a specific gap
Instead of requesting “more security”, describe an evidenced limitation in the fallback procedure. Existing capacity might document incoming applications but be unable to clear the expected backlog on time.
Present options: additional capacity, an improved fallback procedure or different technical protection. State assumptions and remaining limits. Kopexa’s risks, measures and BIA can preserve this basis; our management review guide helps present the decision. The competent body decides within its authority and budget rules.
A useful initial scope
Choose one service, its responsible department and the main dependencies. Kopexa brings together information assets, other assets, risks and measures; BPMN clarifies the workflow. Before procurement, also assess operational, privacy, accessibility and procurement-law requirements. Product functions alone do not replace this assessment.
Quick answers
Frequently Asked Questions
Still have a question? Find the answers here.
Can the IT provider accept every risk for the authority?
Not universally. Technical operation and substantive decision responsibility need separate arrangements. The competent body decides on effects on its mandate.
Sources
- BSIG section 28: Scope — Bundesministerium der Justiz [Accessed ]
- ISO/IEC 27001 — ISO [Accessed ]